2023考研英語(yǔ)閱讀投資人與經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器
Man and machine
投資人與經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器
The economic ideas of the world s most successfulhedge-fund boss;
世界最成功的對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理的經(jīng)濟(jì)思想;
The most beautiful deleveraging yet seen is howRay Dalio describes what is now going on inAmerica s economy. As America has gone throughthe necessary process of reducing itsdebt-to-income ratio since the financial crash of2008, he reckons its policymakers have done well inmixing painful stuff like debt restructuring with injections of cash to keep demand growing.Europe s deleveraging, by contrast, is ugly.
這是我所見(jiàn)過(guò)的最美麗的去杠桿化Ray Daio如此描述美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)狀。2008年經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)以來(lái)，美國(guó)經(jīng)歷了為降低負(fù)債收入比而必須的的過(guò)程，他認(rèn)為美國(guó)的政策制定者們?cè)诰饧质聞?wù)如債務(wù)重調(diào)和資金注入從而保持需求的持續(xù)上升方面做得可圈可點(diǎn)。相比之下，歐洲的去杠桿化顯得丑陋不堪。
Mr Dalio s views are taken seriously. He made a fortune betting before the crash that theworld had taken on too much debt and would need to slash it. Last year alone, hisBridgewater Pure Alpha fund earned its investors 13.8 billion Dollor, taking its total gainssince it opened in 1975 to 35.8 billion Dollor, more than any other hedge fund ever, includingthe previous record-holder, George Soros s Quantum Endowment Fund.
Dalio的觀點(diǎn)備受界內(nèi)關(guān)注。在經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)產(chǎn)生之前，他曾對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)局勢(shì)做了一個(gè)斷言，即世界經(jīng)濟(jì)需要大幅度地削減過(guò)重的負(fù)債。只去年一年，他的 Bridgewater Pure Alpha基金就給投資者帶來(lái)了138億美元的回報(bào)，這也使得該基金達(dá)到自開(kāi)創(chuàng)以來(lái)的358億美元，并超過(guò)了包括以前的紀(jì)錄保持者George Soros的Quantum Endownment基金在內(nèi)的任何一項(xiàng)對(duì)沖基金。
Mr Dalio, an intense 62-year-old, is following in the footsteps of Mr Soros in other ways, too.Mr Soros has published several books on his theories, and is funding an institute to getmainstream economists to take alternative ideas seriously. Mr Dalio, too, is now trying toimprove the public understanding of how the economy works. His economic model is notvery orthodox but gives him a pretty good sense of where the economy is, says PaulVolcker, a former chairman of America s Federal Reserve and one of Mr Dalio s growingnumber of influential fans.
在其他方面，現(xiàn)如今富有激情的已62歲的Dalio也在緊跟Soros的步伐。Soros至今已經(jīng)出版了多本有關(guān)其理論的書(shū)籍，并正在資助一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)，以便促使主流經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對(duì)另類(lèi)思想加以重視。Dalio也在努力促進(jìn)公眾對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)作過(guò)程的理解。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席Paul Volcker，作為Dalio日益增多且頗具影響力的粉絲之一，稱其經(jīng)濟(jì)模式并非絕對(duì)正統(tǒng)，但帶給了他相當(dāng)敏感的經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢(shì)把握能力。
Whereas Mr Soros credits the influence of Karl Popper, a philosopher who taught him as astudent, Mr Dalio says his ideas are entirely the product of his own reflections on his life as atrader and his study of economic history. He has read little academic economics but has conducted in-depth analysisof past periods of economic upheaval, such as the Depression in America, post-war Britainand the hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic. He has even simulated being an investor inmarkets in those periods by reading daily papers from these eras, receiving data andtrading as if in real time.
不同的是，Soros把他的成功歸于其學(xué)生時(shí)代的哲學(xué)家老師 Karl Popper的影響。Dalio則說(shuō)他的思想完全是自己作為一個(gè)交易商的生活感悟和對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)歷史研究的產(chǎn)物。他幾乎沒(méi)有讀過(guò)正統(tǒng)的學(xué)術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，但是他對(duì)過(guò)去的經(jīng)濟(jì)劇變時(shí)期的情況作了深入分析，其中包括美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條，戰(zhàn)后的英國(guó)和魏瑪共和國(guó)的惡性通貨膨脹。他甚至曾假裝自己是當(dāng)時(shí)的投資者，通過(guò)閱讀當(dāng)時(shí)的日?qǐng)?bào)來(lái)獲得數(shù)據(jù)信息，并進(jìn)行現(xiàn)實(shí)般的交易。
In the early 1980s Mr Dalio started writing down rules that would guide his investing. Hewould later amend these rules depending on how well they predicted what actuallyhappened. The process is now computerised, so that combinations of scores of decision-rulesare applied to the 100 or so liquid-asset classes in which Bridgewater invests. These rules ledhim to hold both government bonds and gold last year, for example, because thedeleveraging process was at a point where, unusually, those two assets would rise at thesame time. He was right.
在20世紀(jì)80年代早期，Dalio就開(kāi)始積累決策規(guī)律以備引導(dǎo)他日后的投資。以后的日子里，他會(huì)根據(jù)這些規(guī)律預(yù)測(cè)事實(shí)的準(zhǔn)確度來(lái)修改它們?，F(xiàn)在這項(xiàng)工作已由計(jì)算機(jī)來(lái)處理，從而得出大量決策規(guī)律的組合并將其應(yīng)用于Bridgewater投資的約100項(xiàng)流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)中。比如在去年，因?yàn)椴煌瑢こ５氖?，在去杠桿化進(jìn)程中政府債券和黃金會(huì)同時(shí)漲價(jià)，這些決策規(guī)律指導(dǎo)他同時(shí)握有二者。果不其然，他是正確的。
What Mr Dalio calls the timeless and universal core of his economic ideas is set out in a20-page Template for Understanding that he wrote shortly after the collapse of LehmanBrothers in 2008 and recently updated. The document begins: The economy is like amachine. This machine may look complex but is, he insists, relatively simple even if it isnot well understood. Mr Dalio models the macroeconomy from the bottom up, by focusingon the individual transactions that are the machine s moving parts. Conventional economicsdoes not pay enough attention to the individual components of supply and, above all,demand, he says. To understand demand properly, you must know whether it is funded bythe buyers own money or by credit from others.
Dalio所謂的不受時(shí)間限制，放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)思想核心陳述于20頁(yè)的《用于理解的模板》中。他寫(xiě)于2008年雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)后不久并于近日更新。該文件以經(jīng)濟(jì)就像一臺(tái)機(jī)器開(kāi)始，他堅(jiān)信，這臺(tái)機(jī)器可能看起來(lái)復(fù)雜，但實(shí)際上它是相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)單的，即使是在它不被很好地理解的情況下。Dalio通過(guò)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器的移動(dòng)組成部分個(gè)體交易，來(lái)自下而上地模擬宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)。他說(shuō)，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)對(duì)個(gè)體組成的供應(yīng)尤其是他們的需求關(guān)注不夠。要恰當(dāng)?shù)亓私庑枨螅憔捅仨氈罏樗峁┵Y金的錢(qián)是來(lái)自購(gòu)買(mǎi)者自己還是從他人的借貸。
A huge amount of Bridgewater s efforts goes into gathering data on credit and equity, andunderstanding how that affects demand from individual market participants, such as a bank,or from a group of participants . Bridgewaterpredicted the euro-zone debt crisis by totting up how much debt would need to berefinanced and when; and by examining all the potential buyers of that debt and their abilityto buy it. Mr Volcker describes the degree of detail in Mr Dalio s work as mind-blowing andadmits to feeling sometimes that he has a bigger staff, and produces more relevantstatistics and analyses, than the Federal Reserve.
Bridgewater公司花了大力氣來(lái)收集有關(guān)信貸和普通股的數(shù)據(jù)，并分析其是如何影響單個(gè)市場(chǎng)參與者比如一家銀行和一群參與者的需求的。該公司通過(guò)對(duì)需要再貸款的債務(wù)總值的合計(jì)，以及對(duì)歐元區(qū)債務(wù)潛在購(gòu)買(mǎi)者的數(shù)量和他們的購(gòu)買(mǎi)能力的研究，成功預(yù)測(cè)了歐元區(qū)的債務(wù)危機(jī)和其發(fā)生的時(shí)間。Volcker如此描述Dalio工作的細(xì)節(jié)詳細(xì)程度嘆為觀止，他也承認(rèn)，在有些時(shí)候他有更強(qiáng)大的團(tuán)隊(duì)，并能給出比美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)更中肯的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)和分析。
Two sorts of credit cycle are at the heart of Mr Dalio s economic model: the business cycle,which typically lasts five to eight years, and a long-term debt cycle, which canlast 50-70 years. A business cycle usually ends in a recession, because the central bank raisesthe interest rate, reducing borrowing and demand. The debt cycle ends in deleveragingbecause there is a shortage of capable providers of capital and/or a shortage of capablerecipients of capital that cannot be rectified by the centralbank changing the cost of money. Business cycles happen often, they are well understoodand policymakers are fairly adept at managing them. A debt cycle tends to come along in acountry once in a lifetime, tends to be poorly understood and is often mishandled bypolicymakers.
Dalio的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式中有兩種核心的信貸周期：通常持續(xù)5-8年的商業(yè)周期和長(zhǎng)期的債務(wù)周期，后者長(zhǎng)達(dá)50-70年。一次商業(yè)周期一般在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退中結(jié)束，因?yàn)樵诮?jīng)濟(jì)衰退期，中央銀行會(huì)提高利率，以降低貸款和需求。債務(wù)周期結(jié)束于去杠桿化過(guò)程中，此時(shí)缺乏有能力的資金提供者或資金接收者，而中央銀行卻無(wú)法通過(guò)改變資金成本來(lái)加以調(diào)節(jié)。。商業(yè)周期時(shí)常產(chǎn)生，它們易于理解，也是政策制定者們善于控制的;然而，對(duì)某個(gè)國(guó)家而言，債務(wù)周期往往在人一生中只發(fā)生一次，所以他們對(duì)此不甚了解且往往處理不當(dāng)。
An ordinary recession can be ended by the central bank lowering the interest rate again. Adeleveraging is much harder to end. According to Mr Dalio, it usually requires somecombination of debt restructurings and write-offs, austerity, wealth transfers from rich topoor and money-printing. A beautiful deleveraging is one in which all these elementscombine to keep the economy growing at a nominal rate that is higher than the nominalinterest rate.
中央銀行通過(guò)降低利率來(lái)解決一般情況下的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。而去杠桿化遠(yuǎn)非如此簡(jiǎn)單，據(jù)Dalio稱，它通常需要均衡債務(wù)重調(diào)與銷(xiāo)賬、財(cái)政緊縮、財(cái)富由富有階層到貧困階層的轉(zhuǎn)移以及鈔票印刷之間的關(guān)系。所謂美麗的去杠桿化是指能綜合所有提及的因素從而保持經(jīng)濟(jì)的名義增長(zhǎng)率高于名義利率。
Print too little money and the result is an ugly, deflationary deleveraging ; printtoo much and the deleveraging may become inflationary, as in Weimar Germany. AlthoughMr Dalio says he fears being misunderstood as saying print a lot of money and everythingwill be OK, which I don t believe, all deleveragings have ended with the printing of significantamounts of money. But it has to be in balance with other policies.
印制過(guò)少貨幣的結(jié)果是丑陋的、通貨緊縮的去杠桿化;印制過(guò)多則會(huì)導(dǎo)致類(lèi)似德國(guó)魏瑪?shù)耐ㄘ浥蛎浀娜ジ軛U化。Dalio說(shuō)我并不同意所有去杠桿化都要大量地印制貨幣，那么只要印制鈔票就會(huì)萬(wàn)事大吉的觀點(diǎn)。但是這確實(shí)需要和其他政策均衡作用。即使他說(shuō)自己擔(dān)心被人誤解。
Mr Dalio admits to being wrong roughly a third of the time; indeed, he attributes a big part ofhis success to managing the risk of bad calls. And the years ahead are likely to provide aserious test of whether the economic machine is as simple as he says. For now, he is in amore optimistic mood thanks to the European Central Bank s recent moves, in effect, toprint money. Although he still expects debt restructuring in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland,on top of that in Greece, he says that the risk of chaos has been reduced and we are nowcalming ourselves down.Here s hoping he is right again.
Dalio承認(rèn)他可能在犯第三次錯(cuò)誤，而事實(shí)上，他把自己成功的大部分歸功于對(duì)錯(cuò)誤預(yù)測(cè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的把握上。而且，過(guò)去的幾年似乎是對(duì)他嚴(yán)峻的考驗(yàn)驗(yàn)證經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器是否同他說(shuō)的一樣簡(jiǎn)單。就現(xiàn)在來(lái)說(shuō)，因?yàn)榻袢諝W洲中央銀行正實(shí)行的貨幣印刷舉措，他處于較樂(lè)觀的心態(tài)。即使他仍希望西班牙、葡萄牙、意大利和愛(ài)爾蘭尤其是希臘的債務(wù)重組。他說(shuō)混亂的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)已被降低，我們正在逐步安定下來(lái)。這一次，我們希望它仍然是對(duì)的。
Man and machine
投資人與經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器
The economic ideas of the world s most successfulhedge-fund boss;
世界最成功的對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理的經(jīng)濟(jì)思想;
The most beautiful deleveraging yet seen is howRay Dalio describes what is now going on inAmerica s economy. As America has gone throughthe necessary process of reducing itsdebt-to-income ratio since the financial crash of2008, he reckons its policymakers have done well inmixing painful stuff like debt restructuring with injections of cash to keep demand growing.Europe s deleveraging, by contrast, is ugly.
這是我所見(jiàn)過(guò)的最美麗的去杠桿化Ray Daio如此描述美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)狀。2008年經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)以來(lái)，美國(guó)經(jīng)歷了為降低負(fù)債收入比而必須的的過(guò)程，他認(rèn)為美國(guó)的政策制定者們?cè)诰饧质聞?wù)如債務(wù)重調(diào)和資金注入從而保持需求的持續(xù)上升方面做得可圈可點(diǎn)。相比之下，歐洲的去杠桿化顯得丑陋不堪。
Mr Dalio s views are taken seriously. He made a fortune betting before the crash that theworld had taken on too much debt and would need to slash it. Last year alone, hisBridgewater Pure Alpha fund earned its investors 13.8 billion Dollor, taking its total gainssince it opened in 1975 to 35.8 billion Dollor, more than any other hedge fund ever, includingthe previous record-holder, George Soros s Quantum Endowment Fund.
Dalio的觀點(diǎn)備受界內(nèi)關(guān)注。在經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)產(chǎn)生之前，他曾對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)局勢(shì)做了一個(gè)斷言，即世界經(jīng)濟(jì)需要大幅度地削減過(guò)重的負(fù)債。只去年一年，他的 Bridgewater Pure Alpha基金就給投資者帶來(lái)了138億美元的回報(bào)，這也使得該基金達(dá)到自開(kāi)創(chuàng)以來(lái)的358億美元，并超過(guò)了包括以前的紀(jì)錄保持者George Soros的Quantum Endownment基金在內(nèi)的任何一項(xiàng)對(duì)沖基金。
Mr Dalio, an intense 62-year-old, is following in the footsteps of Mr Soros in other ways, too.Mr Soros has published several books on his theories, and is funding an institute to getmainstream economists to take alternative ideas seriously. Mr Dalio, too, is now trying toimprove the public understanding of how the economy works. His economic model is notvery orthodox but gives him a pretty good sense of where the economy is, says PaulVolcker, a former chairman of America s Federal Reserve and one of Mr Dalio s growingnumber of influential fans.
在其他方面，現(xiàn)如今富有激情的已62歲的Dalio也在緊跟Soros的步伐。Soros至今已經(jīng)出版了多本有關(guān)其理論的書(shū)籍，并正在資助一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)，以便促使主流經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對(duì)另類(lèi)思想加以重視。Dalio也在努力促進(jìn)公眾對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)作過(guò)程的理解。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席Paul Volcker，作為Dalio日益增多且頗具影響力的粉絲之一，稱其經(jīng)濟(jì)模式并非絕對(duì)正統(tǒng)，但帶給了他相當(dāng)敏感的經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢(shì)把握能力。
Whereas Mr Soros credits the influence of Karl Popper, a philosopher who taught him as astudent, Mr Dalio says his ideas are entirely the product of his own reflections on his life as atrader and his study of economic history. He has read little academic economics but has conducted in-depth analysisof past periods of economic upheaval, such as the Depression in America, post-war Britainand the hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic. He has even simulated being an investor inmarkets in those periods by reading daily papers from these eras, receiving data andtrading as if in real time.
不同的是，Soros把他的成功歸于其學(xué)生時(shí)代的哲學(xué)家老師 Karl Popper的影響。Dalio則說(shuō)他的思想完全是自己作為一個(gè)交易商的生活感悟和對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)歷史研究的產(chǎn)物。他幾乎沒(méi)有讀過(guò)正統(tǒng)的學(xué)術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，但是他對(duì)過(guò)去的經(jīng)濟(jì)劇變時(shí)期的情況作了深入分析，其中包括美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條，戰(zhàn)后的英國(guó)和魏瑪共和國(guó)的惡性通貨膨脹。他甚至曾假裝自己是當(dāng)時(shí)的投資者，通過(guò)閱讀當(dāng)時(shí)的日?qǐng)?bào)來(lái)獲得數(shù)據(jù)信息，并進(jìn)行現(xiàn)實(shí)般的交易。
In the early 1980s Mr Dalio started writing down rules that would guide his investing. Hewould later amend these rules depending on how well they predicted what actuallyhappened. The process is now computerised, so that combinations of scores of decision-rulesare applied to the 100 or so liquid-asset classes in which Bridgewater invests. These rules ledhim to hold both government bonds and gold last year, for example, because thedeleveraging process was at a point where, unusually, those two assets would rise at thesame time. He was right.
在20世紀(jì)80年代早期，Dalio就開(kāi)始積累決策規(guī)律以備引導(dǎo)他日后的投資。以后的日子里，他會(huì)根據(jù)這些規(guī)律預(yù)測(cè)事實(shí)的準(zhǔn)確度來(lái)修改它們?，F(xiàn)在這項(xiàng)工作已由計(jì)算機(jī)來(lái)處理，從而得出大量決策規(guī)律的組合并將其應(yīng)用于Bridgewater投資的約100項(xiàng)流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)中。比如在去年，因?yàn)椴煌瑢こ５氖?，在去杠桿化進(jìn)程中政府債券和黃金會(huì)同時(shí)漲價(jià)，這些決策規(guī)律指導(dǎo)他同時(shí)握有二者。果不其然，他是正確的。
What Mr Dalio calls the timeless and universal core of his economic ideas is set out in a20-page Template for Understanding that he wrote shortly after the collapse of LehmanBrothers in 2008 and recently updated. The document begins: The economy is like amachine. This machine may look complex but is, he insists, relatively simple even if it isnot well understood. Mr Dalio models the macroeconomy from the bottom up, by focusingon the individual transactions that are the machine s moving parts. Conventional economicsdoes not pay enough attention to the individual components of supply and, above all,demand, he says. To understand demand properly, you must know whether it is funded bythe buyers own money or by credit from others.
Dalio所謂的不受時(shí)間限制，放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)思想核心陳述于20頁(yè)的《用于理解的模板》中。他寫(xiě)于2008年雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)后不久并于近日更新。該文件以經(jīng)濟(jì)就像一臺(tái)機(jī)器開(kāi)始，他堅(jiān)信，這臺(tái)機(jī)器可能看起來(lái)復(fù)雜，但實(shí)際上它是相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)單的，即使是在它不被很好地理解的情況下。Dalio通過(guò)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器的移動(dòng)組成部分個(gè)體交易，來(lái)自下而上地模擬宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)。他說(shuō)，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)對(duì)個(gè)體組成的供應(yīng)尤其是他們的需求關(guān)注不夠。要恰當(dāng)?shù)亓私庑枨?，你就必須知道為它提供資金的錢(qián)是來(lái)自購(gòu)買(mǎi)者自己還是從他人的借貸。
A huge amount of Bridgewater s efforts goes into gathering data on credit and equity, andunderstanding how that affects demand from individual market participants, such as a bank,or from a group of participants . Bridgewaterpredicted the euro-zone debt crisis by totting up how much debt would need to berefinanced and when; and by examining all the potential buyers of that debt and their abilityto buy it. Mr Volcker describes the degree of detail in Mr Dalio s work as mind-blowing andadmits to feeling sometimes that he has a bigger staff, and produces more relevantstatistics and analyses, than the Federal Reserve.
Bridgewater公司花了大力氣來(lái)收集有關(guān)信貸和普通股的數(shù)據(jù)，并分析其是如何影響單個(gè)市場(chǎng)參與者比如一家銀行和一群參與者的需求的。該公司通過(guò)對(duì)需要再貸款的債務(wù)總值的合計(jì)，以及對(duì)歐元區(qū)債務(wù)潛在購(gòu)買(mǎi)者的數(shù)量和他們的購(gòu)買(mǎi)能力的研究，成功預(yù)測(cè)了歐元區(qū)的債務(wù)危機(jī)和其發(fā)生的時(shí)間。Volcker如此描述Dalio工作的細(xì)節(jié)詳細(xì)程度嘆為觀止，他也承認(rèn)，在有些時(shí)候他有更強(qiáng)大的團(tuán)隊(duì)，并能給出比美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)更中肯的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)和分析。
Two sorts of credit cycle are at the heart of Mr Dalio s economic model: the business cycle,which typically lasts five to eight years, and a long-term debt cycle, which canlast 50-70 years. A business cycle usually ends in a recession, because the central bank raisesthe interest rate, reducing borrowing and demand. The debt cycle ends in deleveragingbecause there is a shortage of capable providers of capital and/or a shortage of capablerecipients of capital that cannot be rectified by the centralbank changing the cost of money. Business cycles happen often, they are well understoodand policymakers are fairly adept at managing them. A debt cycle tends to come along in acountry once in a lifetime, tends to be poorly understood and is often mishandled bypolicymakers.
Dalio的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式中有兩種核心的信貸周期：通常持續(xù)5-8年的商業(yè)周期和長(zhǎng)期的債務(wù)周期，后者長(zhǎng)達(dá)50-70年。一次商業(yè)周期一般在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退中結(jié)束，因?yàn)樵诮?jīng)濟(jì)衰退期，中央銀行會(huì)提高利率，以降低貸款和需求。債務(wù)周期結(jié)束于去杠桿化過(guò)程中，此時(shí)缺乏有能力的資金提供者或資金接收者，而中央銀行卻無(wú)法通過(guò)改變資金成本來(lái)加以調(diào)節(jié)。。商業(yè)周期時(shí)常產(chǎn)生，它們易于理解，也是政策制定者們善于控制的;然而，對(duì)某個(gè)國(guó)家而言，債務(wù)周期往往在人一生中只發(fā)生一次，所以他們對(duì)此不甚了解且往往處理不當(dāng)。
An ordinary recession can be ended by the central bank lowering the interest rate again. Adeleveraging is much harder to end. According to Mr Dalio, it usually requires somecombination of debt restructurings and write-offs, austerity, wealth transfers from rich topoor and money-printing. A beautiful deleveraging is one in which all these elementscombine to keep the economy growing at a nominal rate that is higher than the nominalinterest rate.
中央銀行通過(guò)降低利率來(lái)解決一般情況下的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。而去杠桿化遠(yuǎn)非如此簡(jiǎn)單，據(jù)Dalio稱，它通常需要均衡債務(wù)重調(diào)與銷(xiāo)賬、財(cái)政緊縮、財(cái)富由富有階層到貧困階層的轉(zhuǎn)移以及鈔票印刷之間的關(guān)系。所謂美麗的去杠桿化是指能綜合所有提及的因素從而保持經(jīng)濟(jì)的名義增長(zhǎng)率高于名義利率。
Print too little money and the result is an ugly, deflationary deleveraging ; printtoo much and the deleveraging may become inflationary, as in Weimar Germany. AlthoughMr Dalio says he fears being misunderstood as saying print a lot of money and everythingwill be OK, which I don t believe, all deleveragings have ended with the printing of significantamounts of money. But it has to be in balance with other policies.
印制過(guò)少貨幣的結(jié)果是丑陋的、通貨緊縮的去杠桿化;印制過(guò)多則會(huì)導(dǎo)致類(lèi)似德國(guó)魏瑪?shù)耐ㄘ浥蛎浀娜ジ軛U化。Dalio說(shuō)我并不同意所有去杠桿化都要大量地印制貨幣，那么只要印制鈔票就會(huì)萬(wàn)事大吉的觀點(diǎn)。但是這確實(shí)需要和其他政策均衡作用。即使他說(shuō)自己擔(dān)心被人誤解。
Mr Dalio admits to being wrong roughly a third of the time; indeed, he attributes a big part ofhis success to managing the risk of bad calls. And the years ahead are likely to provide aserious test of whether the economic machine is as simple as he says. For now, he is in amore optimistic mood thanks to the European Central Bank s recent moves, in effect, toprint money. Although he still expects debt restructuring in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland,on top of that in Greece, he says that the risk of chaos has been reduced and we are nowcalming ourselves down.Here s hoping he is right again.
Dalio承認(rèn)他可能在犯第三次錯(cuò)誤，而事實(shí)上，他把自己成功的大部分歸功于對(duì)錯(cuò)誤預(yù)測(cè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的把握上。而且，過(guò)去的幾年似乎是對(duì)他嚴(yán)峻的考驗(yàn)驗(yàn)證經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器是否同他說(shuō)的一樣簡(jiǎn)單。就現(xiàn)在來(lái)說(shuō)，因?yàn)榻袢諝W洲中央銀行正實(shí)行的貨幣印刷舉措，他處于較樂(lè)觀的心態(tài)。即使他仍希望西班牙、葡萄牙、意大利和愛(ài)爾蘭尤其是希臘的債務(wù)重組。他說(shuō)混亂的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)已被降低，我們正在逐步安定下來(lái)。這一次，我們希望它仍然是對(duì)的。
